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Abstract 
The “Human Brain Project” (HBP) is a large-scale European neuroscience and information 
communication technology (ICT) project that has been a matter of heated controversy since its 
inception. With its aim to simulate the entire human brain with the help of supercomputing 
technologies, the HBP plans to fundamentally change neuroscientific research practice, medical 
diagnosis, and eventually the use of computers itself. Its controversial nature and its potential 
impacts render the HBP a subject of crucial importance for critical studies of science and society.  
In this paper, we provide a critical exploratory analysis of the potential mid- to long-term impacts 
the HBP and its ICT infrastructure could be expected to have, provided its agenda will indeed be 
implemented and executed to a substantive degree. We analyse how the HBP aspires to change 
current neuroscientific practice, what impact its novel infrastructures could have on research 
culture, medical practice and the use of ICT, and how, given a certain degree of successful 
execution of the project’s aims, potential clinical and methodological applications could even 
transform society beyond scientific practice. Furthermore, we sketch the possibility that research 
such as that projected by the HBP may eventually transform our everyday world, even beyond the 
scope of the HBP’s explicit agenda, and beyond the isolated ‘application’ of some novel 
technological device. Finally, we point towards trajectories for further philosophical, historical and 
sociological research on the HBP that our exploratory analysis might help to inspire. Our analysis 
will yield important insights regardless of the actual success of the HBP. What we drive at, for the 
most part, is the broader dynamics of scientific and technological development of which the HBP 
agenda is merely one particularly striking exemplification. 
 
Keywords 
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Introduction 
The “Human Brain Project” (HBP) is a large-scale European neuroscience and computing project 
which is one of the biggest funding initiatives in the history of brain research.1 With a planned 
budget of 1.2 billion € over the next decade and building on the prior “Blue Brain Project”, the 
project initiated by Henry Markram pursues the ambitious goal of simulating the entire human 
brain—all the way from genes to cognition—with the help of exascale information and 
communication technology (ICT). The HBP hopes to thereby produce new, brain-like computing 
technologies, so-called neuromorphic computers, which would be both highly energy-efficient and 
usable by the general public.  
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 Despite the potentially enormous significance for both brain research and computer 
technology—as well as society and culture—the ambition and approach of the HBP has been a 
matter of substantial controversy from the beginning, both in the scientific community and the 
general public. Critics have claimed that the model-based bottom-up approach of the project is 
scientifically wrong-headed, have accused the project of not being managed transparently, and have 
attested that the aims of the HBP are too ambitious, such that the project is likely to waste valuable 
resources for research and infrastructure in Europe. It is currently – in mid-2015 – still a debated 
question whether the HBP in its current format and direction should be pursued at all (Bartlett 
2015). The controversy has been fuelled in early 2014 by an open letter to the European 
Commission (EC) signed by over 750 European neuroscientists urging a reform of the HBP even 
before its operational phase was set to begin. They threaten to boycott the project in case no 
independent review panel is in place to assess whether the HBP meets the standards of excellence 
required for a “Future Emerging Technologies” (FET) flagship program (Open message to the EC, 
2014; Nature, 2014; Marcus, 2014). The exclusion of the experimental cognitive neuroscience 
strand from the core project and the emphasis on building ICT infrastructures furthermore raised the 
question whether—despite the project’s name—the human brain and neuroscience are actually at 
the center of HBP research (Fregnac and Laurent, 2014, Nature 2014).  As a result, the HBP now 
increasingly risks losing support from the very scientific community it purports to serve. Most 
recently, the HBP board of directors responded to this criticism and to the report of a subsequent 
mediation committee by taking over the responsibilities of the project’s three executive directors 
Henry Markram, Richard Frackowiak and Karl-Heinz Meyer (Abbott 2015; Enserink, 2015).  
 
Taking a broader, critical perspective on the controversy surrounding the HBP, we ask the 
following questions: What is at issue and at stake in this controversy with regard to the project’s 
potential mid- to long term impacts on the field of neuroscience and on neuroscience’s role in 
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society? How does the use of ICT and simulation in the HBP reconfigure the brain as a research 
object? By analysing the project’s impact beyond its initial scientific or translational agenda, we 
argue that what is at stake in the HBP is not whether it is about the brain or ICT, but whether it can 
show how to create a “brain in the shell”, by extending the neural domain beyond biological brains 
and into the computer. Hence our allusion to the society of “cyberbrains” in the science fiction 
manga “Ghost in the shell”. 
 
Fig. 1: Cover page of the first volume of Kōkaku Kidōtai: The Ghost in the Shell, by  Masamune Shirow 
(1989), displaying the cyborg Motoko Kusanagi, protagonist and major of the counterterrorism force Public 
Security Section 9.  
Online available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghost_in_the_Shell_%28manga%29#/media/File:Ghost_in_the_Shell.jpg  
Analytical perspective and source material 
 
The concept of “experimental systems” (Rheinberger, 1997; Rouse, 2011) figures in the background 
of the first three sections of this chapter. Experimental systems consist of technologies, scientific 
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methods and institutional settings that allow scientists to study the unknown properties of the entity 
under investigation—i.e. the human brain in case of the HBP. The discussion of several proposed 
changes to neuroscientific practice, medicine and ICT will elucidate what kind of experimental 
system the HBP is planning to build. This analysis is valuable regardless of the actual success of the 
HBP in implementing its envisioned research architecture. As we will outline below, many of the 
proposed changes to neuroscience practice have far wider ramifications than those pertaining to this 
one single large-scale project. If it doesn’t happen at this particular juncture and in the context of 
the HBP as currently constructed, many of the proposed measures will quite likely spring up 
elsewhere rather sooner than later. 
 The second analytical concept that we employ is that of an “experimental microworld” 
(Rouse, 1987). It is used to assess the larger transformative potential of a project like the HBP. 
Constituted by experimental systems, such microworlds allow entities to show orderly patterns of 
behaviour that lead researchers to new scientific insights. To successfully extend these insights 
beyond the isolated circumstances in which they were established, it is often necessary to change 
the material configurations of the world outside the laboratory so that the world itself begins to 
resemble the isolated circumstances of the experimental microworlds. Only then can scientific 
insights be used successfully in non-scientific contexts, and only then do they provide their non-
scientific users with new possibilities of action—think of electrical power grids, light bulbs, 
batteries or power outlets that are available and usable for an ever-increasing portion of the public 
(Rouse, 1987, 199, 226ff.) We discuss below how the HBP’s aim of building neuromorphic 
technologies may put such far-reaching material transformations on the agenda, and what impact 
these transformations could have on society and culture in case the HBP comes remotely close to 
fulfilling some substantial parts of its projected research plan.  
The primary sources for our analysis are the “Overall Vision for the Human Brain Project” docu-
ment (HBP, 2013) and the “Framework Partnership Agreement“  (HBP, 2014a, hereafter FPA doc-
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ument), which to date are the most detailed, publicly available documents about the HBP that have 
been authored by the members of the project committee themselves (for the earlier official report to 
the EC see HBP, 2012). We discuss the most important of several proposed changes to neuroscien-
tific practice, medicine and ICT. We furthermore amend our analysis with scientific research and 
overview articles from or on the HBP, official websites, newspaper articles, and blogpost commen-
taries. It needs to be noted, however, that there is to date rather little concrete information—let 
alone independent scholarly analysis—on how the HBP is supposed to operate, which and how 
many of the proposed plans of the Vision and FPA document are actually being pursued at the mo-
ment, and whether some of the issues we discuss in the following are even on the current internal 
agenda of the project or not. In fact, from what can be gleaned from recent reports, much in the or-
ganizational structure of the HBP seems to be in flux as a result of encompassing internal and exter-
nal reviewing (see e.g., Nature 2014; Bartlett, 2015; Abbott, 2015; Enserink, 2015). The available 
body of source material therefore limits our ability to draw more than preliminary conclusions, 
which is why some of the following considerations have a slightly speculative flavour. We therefore 
chose a descriptive and analytical (instead of an overly normative and critical) approach to the 
sources available, which we hope can serve as a starting point for further critical analyses of the 
changing landscape of big-scale neuroscience in the years to come.   
  
Scientific practice 
A good starting point for discussion is the neuroscientific research agenda of the HBP, since one of 
its main goals is to ‘change the way neuroscience is done’ (Markram 2013, 146). The following five 
focal topics delineate the methodological approach and scientific practice that initiates the required 
infrastructure projects, motivates the forms and domains of future applications, and indicates the 
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larger societal implications of the HBP – and potential other projects with comparable agendas – 
discussed in the rest of the paper.  
 
Scaling up 
Big Science projects investigating the brain move away from the common model of small, 
investigator-driven research groups that study the brain at one or a few levels of description and 
with one or a few instruments. Single-cell studies for instance, investigate action potentials at the 
chemical level of ion channels, Ca+ molecules and neurotransmitters. Functional MRI studies in 
humans correlate changes in blood oxygenation within whole cortical areas or networks to the level 
of cognitive tasks (e.g., counting numbers). These different levels are usually assumed to be parts of 
multilevel mechanisms (Craver, 2007), a view that the HBP also embraces with its multi-scale 
modelling approach (cf. HBP, 2013, 37; HBP, 2014a, 14 –15). But instead of studying each level 
individually, the HBP is planning to use most (if not all) laboratory-scale approaches (e.g., 
molecular, genetic, physiological or computational methods) simultaneously and on an industrial 
scale. It therefore attempts to bridge the enormous gap between microscopic and macroscopic 
neuroscientific evidence (such as from single-cell and fMRI studies), a task that is also tackled by 
other, small- and large-scale projects (Bohland et al., 2009; Grillner, 2014; Siero et al., 2014). The 
potential virtue of scaling up the existing approaches is expected to be a better integration of data 
from the many levels of brain organization (cf. HBP, 2013, 56; HBP 2014a, 187). Better integration 
can then be seen as the presupposition for a better understanding of the brain, which is why good 
neuroscience ought to become a large-scale and integrative effort. 
  It is this normative impetus of the agenda that in part stirred the recent controversy 
surrounding the HBP. The critics argue that although multi-level integration and a stronger funding 
is needed to better understand human brain organization, an industrial-scale project with a relatively 
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fixed agenda may not be the best way to achieve such goals. Instead, they support a ‘mechanism of 
individual investigator-driven grants’, which would foster the analytic and creative capacities of 
small research groups with the overall funding level of the HBP (Open message to the EC, June 7 
2014). Even some advocates of the HBP stress that developing new concepts or formulating 
interesting, specific questions about human brain organization will remain the task of small groups 
or individual neuroscientists (cf. P.M. Mathews in Kandel et al., 2013, 663; Grillner, 2014, 1211).  
Although the exact utility of the HBP for later research remains an open question, its initiation is 
already reshaping the global neuroscience landscape: since 2013, projects of a similar scale—
although with different agendas—have been installed or pronounced in the US, Japan, China and 
Australia (Grillner, 2014, 1211; HBP, 2014a, 16). 
 
 Fewer experiments, more models  
While the HBP plans to scale up and integrate existing approaches, it simultaneously moves away 
from acquiring experimental data. The HBP asserts that previous neuroscientific research has 
already generated most of the data necessary for understanding the human brain from genes to 
cognition (cf. HBP, 2014a, 2; HBP, 2013, 6). Besides the strategic collection of mouse and human 
data in the starting phase, the project therefore focuses on multi-scale modelling, prediction and 
simulation of brain structure and function (cf. HBP, 2014a, 3-5; HBP, 2013, 19f.). Through data-
mining of existing studies and by using their own or data from other large-scale projects, the HBP 
aims to identify general principles of brain organization (cf. HBP, 2013, 6–17, Kandel et al., 2013, 
662f.). Unifying the data and principles in multi-scale models would then allow researchers to 
predict, for instance, connectivity patterns at different spatial scales, plasticity changes at different 
time scales, or putative neural mechanisms of organismic behaviour. The predictions generated by 
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these models could then be tested by simulating the brain on the HBP supercomputing platform (cf. 
HBP, 2013, 21; HBP 2014a, 20, 191-94).  
 Whether such model-based predictions will be of scientific value, however, crucially 
depends on the biological data put into the simulations. It is here where the HBP’s vision to create 
biologically meaningful whole-brain simulations within a decade has been criticized as premature 
and overly ambitious. Despite large-scale projects mapping human brain connectivity (e.g., Bohland 
et al., 2009), community consensus suggests that, so far, the data required to properly constrain the 
multi-scale models or simulation-based hypotheses is largely missing (Denk et al. 2012; Fregnac 
and Laurent, 2014). 
Notwithstanding the questionable turn away from data acquisition, the HBP proposes several 
strategies for validating brain models against experimental data. By mining data in common atlases, 
or using strategic imaging and behavioural data, researcherso8 could validate ‘knowledge gaps’ 
about brain organization or multi-scale simulations of neural function (cf. HBP, 2013, 12, 61; HBP 
2014a, 186–90). One-level ‘snap-shot models’ could also be initially validated against biological 
data, before they are trained to display behaviour and cognition (cf. HBP, 2013, 21). This co-
existence of biological and computational validation strategies indicates that the HBP does not 
principally distinguish between the brain as being materially realized in biological tissue or within a 
computer (see also Parker, 2009). Nevertheless, the methodological primacy of simulation and 
modelling over experimentation seems to imply that the focus of the HBP is not the biological brain 
per se. Rather, invasive or non-invasive laboratory experiments on actual biological brains would 
only be the occasion for enabling various theoretical, mathematical and computational scientific 
activities, which can be pursued independently within the fully operating HBP. Since the majority of 
neuroscientists regard experimentation with biological brains as the key procedure towards 
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understanding the brain, it comes as no surprise that the computational focus of the HBP deeply 
challenges current neuroscientific practice. 
 
Virtualizing the lab – cerebral technoscience goes in silica.   
The HBP plans to implement or develop a number of technological innovations that, if successfully 
realized, would move the entire neuroscientific experimental practice into the ICT domain. Once 
the first principles are identified from the data and the first predictions can be inferred from the 
models, the Brain Simulation Platform of the HBP would allow researchers to perform in silico 
experiments. The final outcome would be a closed loop between brain models in virtual bodies (or 
virtual neurorobots) that are interacting with a virtual environment, which can in turn be 
manipulated by the scientists in their virtual laboratories (cf. HBP, 2013, 32, HBP 2014a, 8, 11). 
Such laboratories would include virtual versions of instruments like fMRI or EEG, or eDrugs for 
simulating the mechanisms of brain diseases.  
 The virtue of virtualization is that researchers might gain access and control over the 
biological processes of the brain which are difficult to manipulate in material laboratories. By 
stressing these virtues, the HBP approach defines the main role of in silico experiments as providing 
computational manipulations of multi-scale brain models. In contrast, the comparison of simulation 
results to in vivo or in vitro experiments seems to be of less interest, especially since the limited 
experimental data acquisition is unlikely to produce laboratory counterparts to all virtual 
experiments over the course of the project. This change in priority also provides the HBP with a 
productively provocative answer to those who criticize its simulations as insufficiently constrained 
by biological data: if computational manipulations trump laboratory manipulations, the lack of 
comparison with experimental data can be reinterpreted as a success over the limits of access and 
control in traditional experiments. 
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Standardization 
One apparent drawback of current neuroscientific practice is the enormous variety of experimental 
protocols, data analysis methods and modelling algorithms. The outcome is that results are only 
partially comparable, or even worse, that the high number of possible choices leads to false positive 
results, independently of the quality of the individual experimental design (for the case of imaging, 
see Carp, 2012). Current efforts to standardize neuroscientific research tools (e.g., the Allen Brain 
Atlas) will likely allow neuroscientists to compare results across different laboratory sites more 
accurately. The HBP’s specific contribution to that effort would be six remotely accessible ICT 
platforms (Neuroinformatics, Brain Simulation, Medical Informatics, High Performance 
Computing, Neuromorphic Computing, and Neurorobotics, cf. HBP, 2013, 17; HBP 2014a, 4, 3–9).  
 If the ICT platforms can be sufficiently developed in the 30 month ramp-up phase, 
researchers are expected to use them during the operational phase to mine experimental or clinical 
data, build brain models and interact with them in real time via a human-supercomputer interface, 
build virtual robots based on the insights of the models, and implement some version of these robots 
into neuromorphic computing systems (cf. HBP 2013, 17, 53ff., HBP 2014a, 23f.).  In order to make 
the platforms accessible for non-expert scientific users, the HBP also plans to provide standardized 
versions of experimental protocols, data pipelines and modelling algorithms (cf. HBP 2013, 19, 29, 
37f., HBP 2014a, 184, 196). While it would increase access and comparability, the encompassing 
standardization of the platforms also comes with a loss of experimental flexibility. Many proponents 
of open science, for instance, do not only share their data but also share their code for data analysis, 
so that other researchers can further develop it according to their own needs, geared to their specific 
experimental situation.2 It is currently unlikely that scientists from outside the project will have that 
option, since the use of the HBP platforms is allocated via a partnering project mechanism (initially: 
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a Competitive Calls programme, cf. HBP 2013, 36) based on the milestone-driven approach of the 
HBP core project (HBP 2014a, 13, 212).  Although the HBP publicly supports open source and 
community-driven approaches to scientific inquiry (cf. HBP 2013, 19, 61, HBP 2014a, 9, 25–29, 
184), its current institutional and funding structure places strong constraints on experimental 
flexibility. 
 
Iteration  
Another essential feature of the HBP could be its ability to switch iteratively between many modes 
of scientific inquiry. The idea is that principles extracted from the gathered data can be used for new 
model algorithms, and by using the models for predictions which are themselves tested in in silico 
experiments, new principles might emerge which can in turn be used to create more powerful 
algorithms, leading to better predictions, and so on. This methodological iteration is ideally 
accompanied by the co-evolution of neuromorphic computers that implement the principles of brain 
organization identified so far, and thereby accelerate the iterative process through an increase in 
computing power. The ultimate vision of the HBP is to let methods and technology evolve into an 
exascale supercomputer which is capable of simulating the entire human brain. The iterative 
approach therefore raises the question whether the real goal is to understand the human brain 
(technology being the proxy) or to build the next generation of supercomputers (the brain being the 
proxy).   
 In response to the aforementioned controversy, the EC and the HBP directors stressed that 
the project is primarily concerned with the development of new ICT infrastructure (HBP, 2014b; 
Madelin, 2014a). According to some commentators, the HBP now appears to be a ‘costly expansion 
of the Blue Brain project, without any further evidence that it can produce further [neuroscientific] 
insights’ (Fregnac and Laurent, 2014, 28, see also Bartlett 2015). For reasons that will be elaborated 
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in the section “world making” below, we believe that it is inappropriate to contrast ICT 
development with the neuroscientific research conducted within the HBP, because the iterative 
approach that the project pursues blurs the distinction between computer and brain, making them 
effectively inseparable in practice.  
 The push towards hybridization is already apparent in the active collaborations between the 
HBP and European exascale computing projects (e.g., CRESTA in the UK, DEEP in Germany and 
Mont-Blanc in France) to create ICT that meets the specific demands of whole brain simulations 
(cf. HBP, 2013, 25; HBP 2014a, 193). Independently of specific simulation outcomes, these 
collaborations could turn neuroscience into the next major player in a series of simulation-focused 
research programs—from nuclear weapons research to climate science—that shaped the 
development of supercomputing technologies (Elzen and MacKenzie, 1994). Somewhat parallel to 
the limited flexibility created by the standardized ICT platforms, the goal of building a 
neuromorphic supercomputer furthermore indicates that the HBP approach works with a closed type 
of iteration. Whereas interactions among the elements of the iterative chain (modelling, algorithms, 
predictions, simulations) are possible, interaction with elements from the outside (e.g., exploration 
and conceptual development, question generation, see. O’Malley et al., 2010) is only possible 
insofar as they contribute to the overall goal of the HBP. Open iteration within HBP’s own 
methodology seems not to be possible, or is at least not explicitly intended in a milestone-driven 
approach. 
These five projected and expected changes that the HBP is set to bring to neuroscientific practice 
can be summed up in the following slogan: The HBP sets out to standardize iterative modelling and 
virtual experimentation on a large scale, thereby aspiring to move neuroscientific practice 
successively away from interacting with actual biological brains. 
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Infrastructure 
A goal that is perhaps even more fundamental than simulating the human brain—and certainly also 
more likely to be achieved—is to ‘build a completely new ICT infrastructure for neuroscience […] 
medicine and computing’ (HBP, 2013, 3). Building (Big Science) infrastructures is more 
fundamental than specific scientific goals because the platforms, institutions and facilities will 
outlast the project’s relatively short duration of ten years, even if the goal of simulating the entire 
human brain will not have been achieved by then.3  
 
From experiment to database, from laboratory bench to remote access 
The common training as a neuroscientific practitioner requires students to learn principles of data 
acquisition, experimental design and how to skilfully use laboratory instrumentation (Harrington, 
2010). The ICT platforms of the HBP would instead provide databases as the initial starting point 
of neuroscientific inquiry. While the standard interfaces of the platforms can be also used to upload 
further experimental data from different levels of brain organization, the main task of an HBP 
practitioner would be to use the existing evidence to create a new kind of data, describing simulated 
brain behaviour on multiple levels. The use of such data within virtual laboratories also implies that 
in principle, no material laboratory would be required to conduct a wide range of neuroscientific 
activities (e.g., generating and testing hypotheses, designing in silico experiments or identifying 
causal mechanisms, cf. HBP, 2013, 5, 28, 56; HBP 2014a, 3, 11, 22, 170, 168, 187). The same logic 
also applies to neurologists working within the HBP, for the Medical Informatics platform allows 
them to federate clinical data, i.e. to mine them for biological disease patterns without physically 
removing them from the hospital site of recording (cf. HBP 2013., 27; HBP 2014a, 195). Here, too, 
medical scientific inquiry (e.g., disease classification, drug testing or personalized diagnosis) would 
 
Penultimate draft to appear in: De Vos, J. & Pluth, E. (eds.) Neuroscience and Critique, London: Routledge. 
Do not quote without permission of the authors. 
  
15 
 
be possible in principle without requiring researchers to actually enter a material clinic (cf. HBP 
2013., 38f.).  
 The computer with a remote internet access to the ICT platforms could therefore become the 
actual workplace of the next generation of neuroscientists working in the HBP, even if most or all 
efforts to build neuromorphic supercomputers fail. In that case, there would still remain a less 
encompassing database for experimental and clinical data, accessible via conventional computers. 
Finally, the existence of new simulation facilities implies that the HBP is also a massive data 
generation project (cf. HBP 2013, 57), albeit of a different sort: the data are the outcome of 
computer simulations, not of invasive or non-invasive studies of biological brains. Big Science 
projects often produce more data than the scientists working on them are able to analyse 
immediately, and at times further retrospective analysis leads to surprising discoveries.4 Here, 
another novel possibility of working as a neuroscientist emerges, perhaps closer to archaeological 
research than to experimental laboratory practice. Scientists trained on the ICT platforms of the 
HBP could specialize in large-scale data analysis using different parameter values and pattern 
recognizers without having to conduct their own (laboratory or virtual) experimental work, and 
again independently of whether the HBP goal of building a working human brain simulation is ever 
achieved. 
 
User environments for neuroscientists 
A broader infrastructural change follows from the creation of multiple interfaces to make the 
supercomputing and simulation technology of the HBP accessible to the broader scientific 
community (e.g.,  the Brain Simulation and the Neurorobotics Cockpit, cf. HBP 2013, 22, 34; called 
Virtual Neurorobotics Laboratory in the FPA document, cf. HBP 2014a, 206). Moving 
neuroscientific practice onto ICT platforms thereby creates two types of researcher that are not 
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specific to any particular subdiscipline. The first type is the developer, i.e. a researcher, engineer or 
technician who builds, develops and maintains the platforms themselves (including, besides 
technical apparatuses, the interfaces, data pipelines, implemented algorithms, standard models etc.). 
The second type is the user, i.e. a neuroscientific or medical practitioner who conducts, tests and 
compares her research through the ICT platforms provided by the developer.  
 How separate these two roles will be within the HBP will depend on the feedback loops built 
into the project’s institutional structure during the operational phase (the iterative approach already 
indicates that a dynamic feedback model would be easily possible). The separation seems to be 
quite sharp, however, once researchers outside the project will access the platforms, for they will 
neither have the knowledge nor the skills to maintain supercomputers or large databases.5 The user-
developer distinction furthermore runs orthogonal to more traditional divisions of scientific labour 
such as experimenter-theoretician or basic and applied scientist. What unites both the developer and 
the user, however, is that the ICT platforms establish the computer as the primary object of 
interaction with the neuronal domain, both in the form of commercial devices and specific 
(neuromorphic) supercomputers. 
The two infrastructural changes, then, can be again summarized in a slogan: The HBP developer 
generation aspires to create remotely accessible databases and user environments for scientist-
supercomputer interactions. 
 
Application 
Given that the success of the HBP’s ambitious aim to simulate the entire human brain from genes to 
cognition cannot be guaranteed, there are two kinds of potential application outside neuroscientific 
practice but within the project. Immediate applications are independent of simulating human brains 
with (neuromorphic) supercomputers, while intermediate applications are dependent on at least a 
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partial success of this endeavour. Although not sharp, this distinction allows us to assess the 
likelihood of whether certain transformative potentials of the HBP will be actualized over the next 
decade(s). 
 
Healthcare and medical diagnosis 
The HBP considers improvements in diagnosing and treating brain diseases (i.e. neurogenerative 
diseases, but also anxiety or mood disorders etc.) to be ‘the most immediate impact […] for Euro-
pean society’ (HBP, 2013, 60, see also HBP 2014a, 199). The likelihood of fairly quick changes in 
medical practice initiated by the HBP is comparatively high, because the Medical Informatics Plat-
form and its data federation system are set to function independently of other advances in the pro-
ject. A central access point to physically remote clinical data could indeed provide new ways to 
tackle the challenge of developing novel and potentially more effective diagnoses of Alzheimer, 
Parkinson’s or clinical depression. Even if the HBP will not produce an exascale supercomputer or a 
new powerful paradigm for predicting biological disease signatures in the next decade, the large-
scale nature of the clinical database alone could still substantially transform neurology. To date, 
case-based reasoning and individual syndromic and histopathological tests constitute the most 
common practice for treating patients in this domain of medicine (cf. HBP, 2013, 38, HBP 2014a, 
195).  
 It is peculiar that the proposal for a new, federated clinical database and nosology is repeat-
edly justified with the economic argument that brain diseases cost the European health economy 
800 billion € per year (HBP, 2013, 55, Markram, 2013, 148; Kandel et al., 2013, 659).  The attempt 
to tackle this economic burden scientifically implies a strong medical strand within a Big Science 
project like the HBP. Significantly, it is also said to require science and society to consider ‘clinical 
data as a public good, rather than the proprietary information of health insurers and providers’ (HBP 
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2013, 56). Together with stressing the economic burden of disease, the HBP is ex negativo constru-
ing the Medical Informatics Platform as an investment in the public, a rhetorical figure known from 
the presentation of previous large scale biomedical databases, such as the UK Biobank (Petersen, 
2005).  
The rhetoric of contrasting the health industry’s private data policy with the open data policy 
of the HBP somewhat conceals that ultimately, the same logic is at work in both cases. Like health 
insurers and providers, the HBP’s economic argument configures “health” to be primarily a com-
modity. Clinical data, then, are just the quantified, scientifically objective indicator for individual 
health, and clinical data can therefore be most easily traded in the health market. Biologically valid 
classifications of the data into disease categories are then also the most (cost-)effective way of treat-
ing personal suffering caused by neurological disorders. The suffering or the disorders themselves, 
however, are secondary to the goal of commodifying health more effectively, in about the same 
sense as the biological brain may be secondary to the goal of building neuromorphic computers.  
Although the economic and social or personal effects of “health” cannot be neatly separated 
in contemporary societies, the bioinformatics approach of the HBP medical platform reflects how 
the current EU research agendas increasingly focus on the application of technological fixes to soci-
etal problems. Further sociological and anthropological studies need to critically investigate this 
linear policy approach from technological innovation to the expected increase in the well-being of 
citizens (Levidow and Neubauer, 2014).   
 
Neuromorphic computers for the life world?  
In the vision document of 2013 the  HBP claims, in a characteristic display of its self-aggrandizing 
proposal rhetoric, that the development of neuromorphic computers for general purpose use could 
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represent a ‘disruptive technology with a potential social and economic impact comparable to that 
of the first commercial computer’ (HBP, 2013, 59).6 To construct such a “disruptive” technology as 
an intermediate application, HBP researchers would need to (i) identify organizational principles 
from mouse or human brain data, (ii) incorporate the principles into multi-scale brain models, (iii) 
validate the models and principles by successfully simulating of known brain processes and finally, 
(iv) export a simplified version of the validated model into the Neurorobotics platform, where it can 
be run as the control architecture of a virtual neurorobot on a supercomputer. If the supercomputer 
itself is neuromorphic, then implementing a brain-inspired hardware system with a brain-inspired 
control architecture into a standard size commercial device becomes an engineering problem.  
Although mutual adjustments between (i) to (iv) are possible within the HBP methodology, 
the outcome of one of the elements is also interdependent upon the success of the others. Consider 
the case of building a neuromorphic device with the ability to ‘predict the likely consequences of 
[its] decisions, and to choose the action most likely to lead to a given goal’ (HBP, 2013, 58; cf. HBP 
2014a, 165). The HBP would first have to produce a top-down model of this ability, validate the 
model through simulation, and then export a simplified version of it into the Neurorobotics 
platform. In view of the currently uncertain future of the cognitive neuroscience subproject within 
the HBP (Fregnac and Laurent, 2014; Madelin 2014b), it seems unlikely that human decision-
making will be the first template for a neuromorphic control architecture (cf. also HBP, 2013, 54).  
 Given that there are no commercial applications of neuromorphic computers so far, and 
given that the interdependencies between the iterative elements make the complexity of a first 
application highly unpredictable, the disruptive nature of these technologies most likely does not lie 
in their immediate scientific, economic or societal impact.7 It would rather lie in showing that it is 
possible to extend the neural domain—i.e. the principles governing the behaviour of neural 
entities—beyond the biological brain into a silicon-based computer.8 The disruptive potential of the 
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HBP itself, its immediate impact, then, would derive from concretely exploring this space of 
possibilities over the next decade. 
The proposed immediate and intermediate applications can be summarized in the following slogan: 
The HBP medical database and nosology sets out to foster the commodification of personal health 
as a public good, while the successful construction of a neuromorphic device would show that it is 
possible to extend the neural domain beyond biological brains. 
 
World making 
Combining these prospective changes to neuroscientific practice, infrastructure and domains outside 
of science, we now analyse a number of potential intermediate effects of the HBP (and/or 
comparable present and future initiatives) on the material, socio-economic and perhaps even 
political configurations within which human beings live. The process that is likely to lead to these 
larger implications can be described in three steps, roughly corresponding to the three slogans at the 
end of the previous sections. 
 
The de-organ-ization of the brain 
As described above, the HBP moves away from small-scale invasive animal studies, and from the 
correlational paradigm of imaging studies in cognitive neuroscience. By attempting to change the 
normative standards of neuroscience to multi-scale modelling, predictive neuroinformatics, 
simulation, and large-scale integration, the HBP also attempts to overcome currently unresolvable 
issues such as individual variability (Miller et al., 2012), measurement artefacts (Horton and 
Adams, 2005, 843) and identifying causal mechanisms in the human brain (Logothetis, 2008).  
 
Penultimate draft to appear in: De Vos, J. & Pluth, E. (eds.) Neuroscience and Critique, London: Routledge. 
Do not quote without permission of the authors. 
  
21 
 
The HBP approach could in principle resolve these issues because the new norms of good 
neuroscientific practice also reconfigure the object of investigation, i.e. the brain itself. The move 
away from working on biological tissue de-organ-izes the brain: that is, it shifts the scientific 
significance away from characteristics typical for biological organs, such as its evolutionarily 
contingent organization, the variability of cells and areas, or the biochemical nature of signal 
transmission. What is highlighted instead are the brain’s characteristics that become salient from the 
outlook of predictive informatics, modelling, and simulations, such as the statistical connectivity of 
neurons with different morphologies (Hill et al., 2012), or the electrical signatures around cells 
which can be simulated in a large-scale model (Reimann et al., 2013). While certainly biologically 
informed, these studies produce a non-biological kind of data (i.e. simulation results) which is then 
taken as evidence for the behaviour of the entities in question. In other words, the de-organ-ized 
brain is given the possibility to behave in new ways, if the neuroscientist studying it is able to 
‘monitor and control all states and parameters of the [in silico] experiment’ (HBP, 2013, 33; HBP 
2014a, 187). Once the HBP moves into its operational phase the biological characteristics would 
drop out of the iterative chain step by step, until models could be refined entirely by referring to the 
rapidly accumulating simulation data. But that implies that the new ways of brain behaviour 
enabled by the iterative simulation method of the HBP are themselves—in a strict sense—not 
biological, but computational, in the sense of computer processing steps run on silicon chips. The 
ICT platforms of the HBP therefore not only provide the neuroscientists with a virtualized 
experimental system to work with, but also create a virtual microworld for the de-organ-ized brain 
to live in. This world is also populated by virtual neurorobots and environments, or eDrugs, whose 
behaviour is governed by mathematical algorithms, and is scaffolded by, and probably ultimately 
built into, (neuromorphic) supercomputers. 
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The cerebralization of the computer 
 
It can now be shown why the respective aims of human brain simulation and building an exascale 
supercomputer are in fact inseparable in the practice of the HBP. Evolving multi-scale brain models 
and ICT into a neuromorphic supercomputer also changes the ability of computers to process data 
(in the same way that virtualization changes the space of possibilities for conceivable brain 
behaviour). In order to implement such changes, the HBP proposes to build neuromorphic 
computers by using heterogeneous and highly diverse parts, which behave stochastically, can switch 
between synchronous and asynchronous communication, individually ‘interpret’ received inputs, 
and are organized in a hierarchical and highly recurrent structure (cf. HBP, 2013, 56f.). The 
outcome of changing hardware and software architecture would be that the computer gets 
cerebralized, which is just the flipside of de-organ-izing the brain as described above. By providing 
a virtualized microworld for it, the HBP computers need to become more like the brain in order to 
fulfil their purpose of multi-scale simulation. In the more mature stages of the HBP, then, the 
cerebralized computer and the de-organ-ized brain would become practically indistinguishable for 
neuroscientists who simulate brain processes on the ICT platforms. 
 One possible effect of this indistinguishability is that the HBP reshapes the metaphor of 
“the brain as computer”. Whereas it initially enabled neuroscientists to describe brains as serial or 
parallel information processors, hard-wired circuits etc. (Borck, 2012), the metaphor now implies 
that computers have to become more like brains, via an iterative convergence upon neuromorphic 
devices. It also implies that the brain is the better computer, since traditional computing reaches its 
technological limits without the ability to compute processes that match the complexity of neural 
behaviour. Therefore one might expect that retroactively, what the history of computing was about 
is changed once the first neuromorphic device can be built.9 The HBP’s major initiator and former 
spokesperson Henry Markram already wrote in 2006 that ‘Alan Turing […] started off “wanting to 
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build a brain” and ended up with a computer’ (Markram, 2006, 153). In the context of brain 
simulation and neuromorphic computing Turing’s aim gains the semantic force of a factual claim 
about the prospects of computer science which were back then technically impossible to achieve. 
From the perspective of the HBP today, it was already conceivable back then that computing as a 
field would progress into a stage where it becomes part of the neural domain itself. 
 
Extending the microworld beyond the Human Brain Project 
The final step of the transformative process beyond the initial HBP agenda involves the material 
transformation of the world outside the project’s ICT infrastructure. Here, the history of computer 
development is again instructive. Initially a highly specific tool for academic and military purposes, 
the computer gradually evolved into a commercial device in the late 1980s and became the primary 
point of accessing information through the Internet in the 1990s. The widespread accessibility of the 
latter via Wi-Fi or smartphone technology coincided with the (material) transformation of public 
places (cafés, airports, libraries, classrooms), social and political issues (privacy in social networks, 
WikiLeaks, NSA surveillance), the economy (online shopping and banking, Dotcom Bubble, The 
Internet of Things), and of course, scientific research itself.  
Processes of the kind just described are often inevitable because the material conditions in 
question were simply non-existent before the relevant scientific practice was established. Extending 
knowledge beyond the laboratory is therefore usually not an application to (applied to what?) but 
rather a reconfiguration of the world according to the principles embodied in experimental 
microworlds. As elaborated in the last two sections, the HBP is planning to build a virtual 
microworld that simultaneously enables new possibilities of action for neuroscientists, and new 
ways of behaviour for brains and computers. This microworld can be extended outside the HBP by 
reconfiguring the material conditions—and furthermore the economic, social, cultural and political 
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conditions—so that they resemble the order maintained in the HBP itself. Needless to say, the 
commercial cerebral computer would be the primary interface between the virtual microworld that 
is materially realized in the ICT platforms, and the material macroworld of hospitals, family homes, 
offices, factories or sports stadiums.  
 The reconfiguration of the macroworld is indicated by the intermediate applications of 
neuromorphic devices to non-scientific contexts. Here, the promise is that such devices could 
contribute to the automation of labour in ‘sectors requiring non-repeated actions that are difficult to 
standardize: for instance the construction industry, services and the home’ (HBP 2013, 60; cf. HBP 
2014a, 165). Promising such potential economic benefits falls firmly into the agenda of FET 
program of the EU. The FET’s focus on ICT is itself connected to the “Digital Agenda for Europe” 
within the EU’s “Horizon 2020” funding initiative launched in 2014. Crucial objectives of the 
“Digital Agenda” are the creation of a single digital market in Europe, maintaining European 
competitiveness in R&D of ICT, and fostering ICT-based economies, health and public services, as 
well as the "Digital Science” movement. Given that the EU-funded HBP obviously shares many of 
the aims with these larger policy initiatives, the crucial question is not whether the project aims to 
extend its insights from the micro- into the macroworld, but how it attempts to do so. 
A possible model for interacting with general-purpose neuromorphic devices would be the 
neuroscientific user of the ICT platforms, albeit in a technically less sophisticated form. Such an 
“ordinary” user would have new possibilities of interacting with neuromorphic devices in the 
workplace (manufacturing neurorobots, neuromorphic controllers), through communication (mobile 
devices) or at home (neuromorphic computers or household appliances, cf. HBP 2013, 40; cf. HBP 
2014a, 202). Of course, it seems highly unlikely that any of these devices will be built and 
developed into a marketable commodity in the near future, but the HBP puts at least the possibility 
of doing so on the horizon. It remains to be seen whether and how that possibility will get realized 
over the course of the project. But the preceding remarks should have made clear that Big Science 
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projects like the HBP are world making projects: that is, they are in the business of materially 
reconfiguring the world we live in. They might have the potential to affect our lives in ways that are 
more profound, sustained, and potentially also less reversible than the isolated ‘application’ of this 
or that novel device.  
The final slogan that summarizes this section is as follows: The HBP is a world making project, 
because it plans to build a microworld for de-organ-ized brains and cerebralized computers, and 
shows how it is possible to extend this microworld through reconfiguring the macroworld via non-
scientific neuromorphic devices and a new type of ordinary user. 
 
Ethics and Society 
 
A project division that requires particular critical attention is the HBP’s Ethics and Society 
Programme, whose level of funding with about 3% of the overall budget roughly mirrors the 
proportion of relevance accorded to ethics and society in the Human Genome Project. Given such a 
massive section dealing with foresight, social impacts, ethics, and public engagement (HBP, 2013, 
43f.; HBP 2014, 208ff.), it might be objected that the kind of external analysis we conduct here is 
superfluous, as the project’s own researchers might be considered to be in a better position to 
analyse and evaluate the initiative. We reject both parts of this objection, because the available 
Vision and perspective documents are not putting any relevant emphasis on the issues we have 
addressed in this chapter. Besides the usual programmatic of scientific research ethics, the 
documents mostly raise rather classical (neuro-)philosophical questions—such as freedom of the 
will, the biological basis of consciousness or psychiatric illness, etc.—questions that are 
considerably less relevant when it comes to understanding the impacts specific to the HBP’s agenda. 
The issues regarding the potential formatting effects exerted by novel technologies and research 
procedures, medical practice, personal computing, or various data management policies do not 
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figure prominently in the documents. What has been slightly modified between the 2013 and 2014 
versions, however, is the ratio of emphasis between narrowly ethical and broader societal and public 
acceptance issues, where the latter have gained increasing prominence. This can be considered a 
step in the right direction – particularly given the fact that the Ethics and Society Programme 
initially seemed at risk of adopting little more than a standard neuroethics approach to brain 
research. This would have amounted to little more than unabashed advertising campaigns for 
specific lines of research (cf. de Vries, 2007). Refocusing on issues of technology assessment, 
foresight and public participation, while taking into account normative factors tacitly at work in 
those sectors of society into which potential innovations are set to be introduced (HBP 2014, 209), 
are steps that should be welcomed, although not without critical caution. 
 While the potential for forms of intensified critical engagement within the project might also 
be gleaned from a recent paper by HBP Foresight Lab leader Nikolas Rose (Rose, 2014), project 
initiator and former spokesperson Henry Markram had a quite different vision for this segment of 
the HBP. To Markram, the task of the Ethics and Society program was chiefly one of ‘building 
public support’ (Markram, 2013, 150). Apparently, he construed the public’s understanding of the 
HBP as one of entirely ungrounded fears that arise with regard to the project’s impact on matters 
diffusely perceived as relevant to our humanity. Accordingly, the task of a neuroscience initiative 
would be to ‘recognize these fears, lay them to rest and actively build support for neuroscience 
research’: for instance through education and trust building (ibid.). Drawing on the our analysis 
above, it almost seems like Markram wanted the HBP’s Ethics and Society Programme to prepare 
and condition the wider public for future transformations of the macroworld to come, rather than to 
engage in critical studies that would have the potential to impact the HBP's agenda, let alone 
unsettle it in as of yet unforeseeable ways.10 In stark contrast to this perspective, our assessment 
here should have made clear that further independent and critical analyses by STS and 
‘neuroscience-in-society’ scholars are needed in order to prevent that the HBP agenda will influence 
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or, at worst, even monopolize scholarly assessments of the project’s likely impacts on neuroscience 
and society. Elsification here 
 However the future of the HBP will play out, it is crucial that the potential impacts of the 
projected agenda on the technical and informational infrastructure of science, medicine, education 
and personal computing are subjected to thorough independent scrutiny from multiple perspectives. 
This being said, it must also be noted that this task calls for a certain amount of patience and also 
for a dose of hermeneutic charity in one’s assessments some aspects of the scientific agenda, 
including those that may at first glance seem fantastically exaggerated. Before us appear the initial 
stages of what will likely be a long game of piecemeal restructuring of several sectors of science 
and society, with far wider implications than those pertaining to the fate of this one particular 
project. We risk missing out on relevant issues if we jump on the first opportunity to enter the 
familiar reflex currents of academic critique. What is called-for instead is the more difficult task of 
staying closely attuned to a large number of developments in order to grasp what will likely remain 
a highly complex and fluid situation. In the present paper we could do no more than outline very 
first steps of what will hopefully become a sufficiently broad and informed assessment of 
transformations whose full extent and full range of consequences have only just appeared on the 
horizon. 
  
Conclusion 
How does our analysis help understand the larger stakes of the current controversy about the place 
of neuroscience in the HBP? To date, it seems like the critics’ demands are going to be fulfilled, 
since the EC announced an independent review of the project in early 2015, and promised to 
biennially evaluate the scientific and organizational agenda before approving further funding 
(Madelin, 2014b). With the decision to not publish the complete first interim report, however, the 
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HBP continues its restrictive information policy (Abbott 2015).11  Thus, there are very good reasons 
to remain cautious, since the project’s basic institutional structure of an EU-funded core project and 
regionally funded partnering projects, as well as the scientific direction of ICT infrastructure 
building and whole brain simulation, will likely remain unchanged.  Based on our analysis, we 
would add that the construction of standardized ICT infrastructures—perceived as a positive 
development by the majority of the neuroscience community—could have wide-reaching impacts 
on neuroscientific practice independently of the HBP’s aim of whole-brain simulation. With regard 
to the disciplinary effects of integration, standardization and iteration, paired with the HBP’s 
potential impact on society and culture that we call “world making”, one could speak of a massive 
lateral agenda of the HBP which demands critical scrutiny.  
 Perhaps the most persistent force contravening these expected effects remains the currently 
fragile support of the HBP by the neuroscientific community. Even in disciplines where 
standardization is widely supported, heated debates remain over the reliability and proper use of the 
shared methods and tools (Leonelli, 2012). It is here where neuroscientific practitioners critical of 
the HBP could remain an active force of resistance that reaches beyond the current dispute over 
transparency and scientific excellence. With regard to the prospects of reform, however, it is crucial 
to see that the power relations between the HBP and its critics are asymmetric. The HBP has now 
gained a material and intellectual gravitas—with hundreds of researchers, collaborators, buildings, 
an education programme etc.—which could make it ‘too big to fail’, even if the bottom-up 
simulation approach towards the brain turns out to be scientifically unfruitful (Schatz, 2013). 
 Besides the analysis of the current issues and future stakes of the HBP, our remarks should 
also be seen as first steps towards more encompassing critical studies of the HBP. They could serve 
as outlines for various questions that might be investigated from different science studies 
perspectives:  
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- HPS and STS of computer simulation: How does the large-scale, standardized, multi-level 
simulation practice of the HBP bear on discussions about the relationship between 
experiments, simulations, and theories (Winsberg, 2003)? More specifically, what are the 
epistemological and ontological implications of the aim to create a non-biological target 
system for human brain simulation in the form of a neuromorphic supercomputer (Parker 
2009)? More broadly, what are the (institutional and economic) implications of the 
simulation- and ICT-based approach for neuroscientific research culture, and how do they 
differ from simulation in astrophysics, meteorology, and nanotechnology (Johnson, 2006; 
Sundberg, 2010) or in-silico experimentation in molecular biology (Moretti, 2011)? 
- Medical anthropology and medical humanities: How could the data-federation system and 
clinical database of the HBP transform local and global medical practice and health care? 
How does the commodification of “health” as a public good (in the form of clinical data) 
relate to the concept of “venture science” and capitalized bio-power (Sunder Rajan, 2006; 
Cooper, 2008)? How do medical clinical databases relate to the discussions surrounding E-
health and the Patient 2.0 (Jensen, 2005; Langstrup et al., 2013)? 
- History and philosophy of neuroscience and technology: How will large ICT platforms in 
the HBP impact the relation between users and developers in scientific practice (Millerand 
and Baker, 2010)? More generally, how does it relate to the historical emergence of “the 
user”, i.e. the type of person interacting with a computer (Stadler, 2014)? Moreover, how 
does neuromorphic computing reconfigure the long history of technomorphic metaphors of 
the brain—from the telegraph to the network (Borck, 2012)? And finally, how does the need 
for computing power for whole-brain simulations reshape the socio-technological 
development of supercomputers (Elzen and MacKenzie, 1994)? 
- Historical ontology / political theory of future technologies: Perhaps less emphasized in our 
paper is how the notions of de-organ-ized human brains and cerebralized computers relate to 
the question of what it means to be human in the 21st century. Do policy agendas about the 
use of “converging technologies” that aim to increase human performance (or public science 
reports about the impact of neuromorphic technologies on society) make it legitimate for 
scholars to announce the dawn of a “trans-human” society (Fuller 2011, 2012), or are such 
announcements premature? At stake here is an assessment of the intensifying debates about 
issues such as human enhancement, life extension, or technological singularity in the context 
of the political, economic, and social orientations that inform them. 
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Obviously, this list is incomplete and just points to some of the links between our analysis of the 
HBP and prevalent themes in science studies that strike us as potentially fruitful for further 
investigation. Our hope is that we can thereby motivate researchers from disciplines including, but 
not restricted to the ones mentioned above, to consider the HBP as a significant research topic for 
critical inquiries into contemporary science, technology and society. 
Notes 
1  See the official website of the project: http://www.humanbrainproject.eu. 
2 A good example is the community driven, open-source software development system 
NeuroDebian (Halchenko and Hanke, 2012). 
3  For reasons of space we have to omit a discussion of the large-scale educational programme of 
the HBP (cf. HBP, 2013, 44f.). We would note, however, that the plan to educate 5,000 PhD 
students within a decade could foster the simulation-based approach to neuroscience independent 
of the specific outcomes of the HBP (the precise number of PhD’s is not provided in the FPA 
document, cf. HBP 2014a, 28f). The education programme also represents a form of institutional 
reproduction commonly found in Big Science projects—see also the analysis of the remote 
access site “Nanohub” within the US Network for Computational Nanotechnology by Johnson 
(2006), 46f. 
4  An example of such a discovery is provided by the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, 
where the decay pattern of Higgs bosons was identified in the data long after the Tavatron 
particle accelerator had already been shut down (Fermilab, 2012). 
5 Depending on the project phase, the HBP could also exemplify aspects of Sundberg’s (2010) 
organizational typology of simulation code collectives. In the ramp-up phase, the HBP seems to 
function internally like a “code of the centre collective”, where development (and use) of the ICT 
platforms is tied to HBP membership. During the operational phase, it could resemble a “code 
spread all around collective”, where HBP members are internally split into “core developers” and 
periphery developers or users respectively, while nonmembers could take up the position of 
external developers in the Competitive Calls program or to maintain the community driven Wiki 
“Brainpedia” (HBP, 2013, 19, 34). 
6 Neuromorphic computing was developed by Caltech electrical engineer and computer scientist 
Carver Mead in the 1980s as an alternative to ICT that relies on “Moore’s law”, i.e. the 
conjecture that the number and density of transistors doubles roughly every two years. 
Neuromorphic computers could therefore provide a promising, low-energy alternative to meet 
the increasing demand of computing power in the future. Only recently, it has become possible to 
build large-scale neuromorphic systems (e.g., in the SpiNNaker group, UK, the EU FACETs 
program, or the DARPA SyNAPSE program, USA), although these systems currently do not 
meet the desired energy efficiency of 10 million Multiply Accumulate Operations per second and 
Watt (Hasler and Marr, 2013, 19f.). The HBP crucially builds upon further improvements of 
these technologies in order to run its multi-level human brain simulations on exascale 
supercomputing technology (cf. HBP 2013, 23ff., HBP 2014a, 191ff.). Note that the use of the 
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word ‘disruptive’ was derived from the initial call for the FP7 program of the EC, but has been 
subsequently dropped in later official reports of the HBP. 
7  In August 2014, the SyNAPSE team has built the first neuromorphic chip called “IBM 
TrueNorth” that could be used for commercial application (Merolla et al., 2014). It runs with 769 
times less energy than the SpiNNaker microprocessor. While this energy reduction seems to be 
an enormous step forward for neuromorphic computing, it remains to be seen how fast IBM can 
transfer this prototype into applicable commercial devices, and how TrueNorth may influence the 
neuromorphic agenda of the HBP.   
8 We consider the extension of inquiry beyond an initial domain to be an integral aspect of 
scientific research (Rouse, 1987, 2011). As a comparison, consider how in 19th century physics, 
electricity and magnetism were considered two independent phenomena, until the laboratory 
practices of Oersted, Ampère, Faraday and others established new concepts to study the 
interaction between electrical wires and magnets (Steinle, 1997). It is similarly a trademark of 
how the HBP understands the brain conceptually that it recognizes a shared boundary between 
the neural domain and the domain of computing. Implementing ICT platforms that serve as 
interdisciplinary “trading zones” (Galison, 1996) between both domains is therefore a practical 
consequence of that conceptual understanding. 
9 Our claim here draws on Rheinberger (1997), who argues that the initial target of scientific 
inquiry—what it is ‘about’—can retroactively change depending on the further directions an 
experimental system subsequently takes. Rheinberger’s example is Peyton Rous’ chicken 
sarcoma system, which initially seemed to be about the link between viral entities and cancerous 
cell growth, but subsequently became a means to study normal cell physiology with the help of 
ultracentrifuges. Only after WW II (in part through the introduction of electron microscopy into 
molecular cell biology) did viruses re-appear as a determinate entity within the sarcoma system. 
Rous’ conjectures about the viral origin of cancer were therefore retroactively supported, after 
being largely ignored by the research community for 40 years (Rheinberger 1995, 56ff., 76f.). 
10 The HBP therefore neatly follows the Horizon 2020 research agenda, which for the most part 
diminishes the role of the social sciences and humanities in the guidance—if not 
reinforcement—of ‘capital-intensive technoscientific solutions’ to the ‘grand challenges’ of 
European society (Levidow and Neubauer, 2014). 
11 Abbot’s claim that the report was not published is not entirely true, since a summary of it is 
available (Digital Agenda for Europe 2015). Many of the recommendations made in this 
summary resemble the critical points that we mentioned above (e.g., stronger involvement of the 
neuroscientific practitioners outside the HBP in the early use and adjustment of the ICT 
platforms, and a more open exchange between experimental and computational subprojects, cf. 
ibid., 2, 4). Note however, that the summary of the report mainly concerns issues of transparent 
communication and the better integration of the subprojects within the overall structure of the 
HBP. It therefore does not deal with what we have called above the lateral agenda of the HBP. 
For the different kinds of rhetoric surrounding the report, compare the above document to Van 
der Pyl (2015). 
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